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Abstract. In group decision-making, people take insufficient account of the information coming from others. We hypothesize that this
can be explained by an ownership bias that would especially occur in competition, rather than in cooperation. In a two-phase decision-
making situation, people reached an initial decision and then evaluated the value of their own information and the consistent and incon-
sistent information of others under different conditions of goal interdependence (cooperation or competition). Finally, then had to reach
a final decision regarding a road accident. Results showed an ownership bias in information value which is stronger in competition than
in cooperation. Moreover, decision quality was lower in competition than in cooperation, an effect mediated by the ownership bias,
beyond the preference effect.
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Making optimal group decisions is of paramount impor-
tance in organizational, political, and educational settings,
but empirical research has documented that this in fact sel-
dom occurs. Making optimal group decisions is hampered
because people take insufficient account of unshared infor-
mation (information that some members possess, but not
others), even when this information is critical to an optimal
decision (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994). Recent
evidence suggests that this may be due to a biased evalua-
tion of unshared information (Mojzisch, Grouneva, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2010). Two biases in the evaluation of un-
shared information have been identified in the literature.
First, people evaluate their own information more favor-
ably than that of others (an effect called “ownership bias”;
Van Swol, Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). Second, when con-
sidering the information of others, people favor informa-
tion that is consistent, rather then inconsistent, with their
initial preference (an effect called “preference effect”;
Greitemeyer & Schultz-Hardt, 2003).
Although these evaluation biases have been investigated
in several studies, most of them overlooked the interdepen-
dence among group members so typical of group decisions,
namely, that people can work cooperatively as well as com-
petitively (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004).
Recent research showed that group members overestimate
confirmatory information in competitive, more than in co-
operative decision-making settings (Toma & Butera,
2009). This research also shows that this behavior results
in reduced quality of decision-making.
The present article investigates the moderating role of
cooperation, competition on the ownership bias. We test the
hypothesis that ownership bias could explain suboptimal
group decision in competition as compared to cooperation
mode, beyond the preference effect.
Ownership Bias and Preference Effect
Research has long shown that people evaluate themselves
more favorably than others (e.g., Brown, 1986). This re-
search has pointed to a number of self-other biases, such as
the fact that people believe that they are happier, more in-
telligent, and less prejudiced than others (McFarland &
Miller, 1990) – and generally better than the average others
(Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg,
1995). Also, people tend to emphasize the difference be-
tween themselves and others when they are asked to judge
their lives (Krueger & Heckhausen, 1993), their future
(Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993),  or their  personality
(Alicke et al., 1995). They quickly and effortlessly develop
ownership of their arguments, which become part of the
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extended self and are therefore overevaluated (De Dreu &
van Knippenberg, 2005). People more easily recall their
own contribution to a joint product than that of others (Ross
& Sicoly, 1979); the increased accessibility of one’s own
contribution causes its favorable evaluation (Roese & Ol-
son, 1994).
In group decision-making, Chernyshenko, Miner, Bau-
mann, and Sniezek (2003) described a specific form of self-
other bias, the ownership bias, and suggested that if mem-
bers do not take into account the information of others, it
is because they simply give more value to their own infor-
mation compared to that of others. In one study with real
group discussion, they found that participants judged their
own discussed unshared information as more important
than the discussed unshared information of others. Van
Swol et al. (2003) also found that participants have an own-
ership bias toward rating information they received before
the group discussion (own information) as more valid and
familiar than information not received (others’ informa-
tion). More recently, Mojzisch et al. (2010) replicated the
ownership bias and showed that the quality of own infor-
mation was perceived as higher than the quality of infor-
mation added by the other group members. These authors
also made a distinction between others’ information that
was consistent or inconsistent with participants’ initial
preference. This distinction revealed that the ownership
had an effect on information evaluation for preference-con-
sistent information, but not for preference-inconsistent in-
formation.
This distinction is important because research on confir-
mation bias has found that people have a preference for
information that confirms their initial opinion compared to
information that disconfirms it (for review, see Frey, 1986).
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) examined how this
bias affects information evaluation in group decision-mak-
ing. In their research participants received only part of the
unshared information and were asked to form an initial
opinion about the best candidate for a managerial position.
After making this decision, participants individually read a
transcript of a group discussion in which they received the
full set of information. Despite learning all the information,
participants maintained their initial preference and failed
to solve the problem. The authors found that confirmation
bias was responsible for this effect: Participants evaluated
the information consistent with their initial preference as
more important than information inconsistent with their
initial preference
What are the implications of these findings for the own-
ership bias? If people favor consistent over inconsistent in-
formation (Greitmeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003), then evi-
dence for a real ownership bias would require that people
evaluate their own information as superior to the both con-
sistent and inconsistent information of others. Simply giv-
ing more weight to one’s own information compared to the
inconsistent information of others would reflect that people
prefer consistent over inconsistent information (the prefer-
ence effect). The study of Mojzisch et al. (2010) found an
ownership bias for the consistent information, but not for
the inconsistent information. How can this result be ex-
plained? If the ownership bias consists in that people favor
own over that of others, shouldn’t we expect people to eval-
uate own information as superior to both consistent and
inconsistent information coming from others?
We argue here that the extent to which people favor one
type of information over another should depend on the
goals people pursue during the interactions with others.
People might not always favor consistent over inconsistent
information (as in Greitmeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003) and
might not always favor their own information over that of
others (as in Van Swol et al., 2003). When in decision-mak-
ing situations members pursue cooperative goals, they may
value the inconsistent information of others, so that a pref-
erence effect and an ownership bias for consistent informa-
tion are less likely to occur. This should not be the case
when members pursue competitive goals. We argue that
that people exhibit these biases in information evaluation




When making decisions with others, people can work co-
operatively as well as competitively (Wittenbaum et al.,
2004). Indeed, various competitive goals (desire to attain a
high status, to prove competence) can arise in group deci-
sion-making and affect the processing of information need-
ed for an optimal decision (Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita,
1976; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Recent work showed
that taking into account whether the setting is cooperative
or competitive offers a better understanding of real-world
processes involved in decision-making and information
processing (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008;
Toma & Butera, 2009).
In particular, Toma and Butera (2009) showed that com-
petition more than cooperation leads members to avoid in-
consistent information in real group discussions, which in
turn impairs decision-making. In the specific case of the
preference effect, Toma, Gilles, and Butera (in press) used
a paradigm similar to the one of Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt (2003) and found that people favored consistent over
inconsistent information in competition, while the reverse
was found in cooperation. Moreover, the preference effect
was responsible for lower quality decisions in competition
than in cooperation. Thus, the tendency to prefer consistent
information and to avoid inconsistent information appears
to be more pronounced in competitive settings. The present
research aims to provide evidence that competition, more
than cooperation, also elicits higher levels of ownership
bias, which should in turn result in lower achievement in
decision-making.
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Two lines of research support the above hypothesis. On
the one hand, research on self-other bias suggests that this
bias can be moderated by dispositional and situational fac-
tors (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). For in-
stance, it has been shown that biases in favor of self can be
moderated by the level of narcissism (John & Robins,
1994), by the relative closeness between self and others
(Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998), or by a self-
evaluation threat (Muller & Butera, 2004). In particular,
Muller and Butera (2004) showed that the self-other bias
tends to be higher when there is a threat on self-evaluation,
than when this threat is absent. Competition implies a
“threat-rigidity reasoning,” whereby people are focused on
their own mindset, opinion, or information (De Dreu & Nij-
stad, 2008). Competition also implies that one has to show
oneself to be better than others to obtain some outcome.
When one has to prove oneself in front of others, this might
impose a self-evaluative threat (Dickerson, Gruenewald, &
Kemeny, 2004). As a consequence, in competition people
might tend to enhance the value of their own information
over that of others.
On the other hand, research on goal interdependence
suggests that negative interdependence (i.e., competition)
is associated with negative judgments of the positions and
information of others (Johnson & Johnson’s, 1989, 1995).
Under cooperation, information given by others can be
trusted because cooperation is beneficial to all (e.g., Buchs,
Butera, & Mugny, 2004); under competition, information
given by others is perceived as suspicious because thought
to serve personal gain and power (De Dreu et al., 2008).
Research suggests that if a self-other bias occurs in a given
context, this could be due to the enhancement of the self,
the diminishment of others, or both (Krueger, 1998). In line
with this idea, research on achievement goals suggests that
competitive goals are associated with the enhancement of
self-competence and the disdain of the partner’s compe-
tence (Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera,
2006). When people are motivated by competition, they are
concerned with their own contribution and seek to differ-
entiate from the others (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).
In sum, several lines of research support the hypothesis
that the ownership bias should be stronger in competition
than in cooperation (Hypothesis 1). In other words, we ex-
pect that the information of others is judged less valuable
than one’s own more in competition than in cooperation.
As pointed out earlier, if the ownership bias consists of
people favoring their own over the information of others,
the critical test of the ownership bias is to find that people
evaluate their own information as superior to both consis-
tent and inconsistent information coming from others – and
not only to consistent information, which would be a pref-
erence confirmation bias. Thus, the interaction effect pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 1 should be due to the fact that people
evaluate own information as superior to both consistent and
inconsistent information coming from others under compe-
tition, which should not be the case under cooperation (Hy-
pothesis 2). Indeed, inconsistent information provided by
others is extremely valuable in decision-making in general
and in hidden profiles in particular, as it allows us to rule
out suboptimal solutions (e.g., Toma & Butera, 2009). Un-
der cooperation, people should be able to recognize the val-
ue of inconsistent information and therefore the ownership
bias should occur for consistent, but not for inconsistent
information (as in Mojzisch et al., 2010). Finally, we hy-
pothesize that the ownership bias should account for the
negative impact of competition, as compared to coopera-




A group of 50 undergraduate students from a university in
Switzerland volunteered in this study. The sample included
24 women (M = 22.6 years, SD = 3.24). Preliminary anal-
yses revealed that sex did not influence our dependent vari-
ables, and this was then discarded from analyses. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental
conditions (cooperation vs. competition).
Procedure and Materials
We used the same procedure as Greitemeyer and Schulz-
Hardt (2003): Participants studied a decision case individ-
ually and then received additional information from two
fictitious group members. More specifically, participants
worked individually on a decision-making task concerning
a road accident investigation. They were led to imagine a
situation of informational interdependence with two ficti-
tious partners. They were informed that neither they nor the
two partners had received the entire information needed to
make an optimal decision. Participants were told that their
task was to work as police inspectors in order to identify
the person responsible for the accident. In this road acci-
dent, four persons were potential suspects, but based on a
set of 9 clues, three of them could be exonerated (Mr. X,
Mrs. Y, Mr. Z) and the fourth (Mr. X’s son) was incrimi-
nated. These information clues were critical as they were
all necessary to identify the guilty person in the accident
(correct decision). All participants received the same set of
information containing only three of the nine critical clues.
These three clues were designed to lead to the initial solu-
tion of Mr. X being responsible (incorrect decision). Par-
ticipants were informed that the remaining six critical clues
had been distributed to their two partners. They first had to
form an initial opinion about the guilty person in the acci-
dent before being given the remaining cues. The goal in-
terdependence (cooperation, competition) manipulation
was then introduced. In cooperation, participants were in-
formed that a successful end to the investigation would
250 C. Toma et al.: Cooperation, Competition, and Ownership Bias




































































































bring a very promising promotion to the team (superior po-
sition of the team in the police station), and that each one
should strive to find the correct solution. In competition,
participants were informed that, beyond team promotion,
one of them could obtain a very promising individual pro-
motion (becoming the superintendent), if he/she is the first
one in the groups who finds the correct solution. Then, they
were provided with a discussion protocol corresponding to
the group interaction between themselves and the two fic-
titious partners. In this discussion protocol, the sets of in-
formation from the two partners and thus the 9 critical clues
(self and others’ information) were presented. Participants
were given no information about others’ initial opinions.
Information Evaluation
The participants evaluated to what extent each of the nine
items of information was important to reaching the optimal
decision, on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all important)
to 9 (= very important). These items of information can be
distinguished in terms of source: three given originally to
the participants (thereafter referred to as own information)
and six given originally to the two other group members
(thereafter referred to as others’ information). Own and
others’ information were presented in a random order for
each participant. Others’ information can be distinguished
in terms of consistency with participants’ initial preferenc-
es. Three items support participants’ initial opinion and are
thus consistent with own information (α = . 72), and three
items do not support participants’ initial opinion and are
thus inconsistent with own information (α = .78).
Final Decision
Once the participants had evaluated all pieces of informa-
tion, they were asked to indicate their final decision con-
cerning the person responsible for the accident (coded 1 for
correct decision – Mr. X’s son; and 0 for incorrect decision
– Mr. X, Mrs. Y, or Mr. Z).
Manipulation Checks
Finally, all participants were asked how tense would have
been the climate in a real group interaction on 9-point
scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 9 (= yes, definitely).
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter thanked the
participants, explained the purpose of the experiment, and




As expected, participants rated that the climate would be
tenser in competition (M = 6.76, SD = 1.59) than in coop-
eration (M = 5.12, SD = 2.49), F(1, 48) = 7.71, p < .01, ηp²
= .14.
Information Evaluation
Information evaluation was analyzed with a 2 (Goal inter-
dependence, cooperation, competition) × 3 (Information
type, own, other consistent, other inconsistent) mixed-
ANOVA with Information type as repeated measure with
three levels. The within-participant factor yielded a signif-
icant effect, F(1, 47) = 16.04, p < .001, ηp² = .41. Own
information (M = 6.78, SD = 1.41) was evaluated more
favorably than others’ consistent information (M = 5.29,
SD = 1.86), F(1, 48) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp² = .36, but also
than others’ inconsistent information, (M = 5.24, SD =
1.62), F(1, 48) = 22.39, p < .001, ηp² = .32. This main effect
was qualified by the interaction with Goal interdependence
predicted by Hypothesis 1, F(1, 47) = 8.03, p < .01, ηp² =
.25, as illustrated in Figure 1.
We also analyzed the effect of information type sepa-
rately for cooperation and competition using simple con-
trasts. In cooperation, own information (M = 6.23, SD =
1.25) was evaluated more favorably than consistent in-
formation (M = 4.57, SD = 1.74), F(1, 48) = 14.95, p <
.001, ηp² = .25, but not more important than inconsistent
information (M = 5.75, SD = 1.54), F(1, 48) = 1.25, p =
.27. In competition, own information (M = 7.33, SD =
1.36) was evaluated more favorably than both consistent
(M = 6.00, SD = 1.76), F(1, 48) = 11.85, p < .01, ηp² =
.19, and inconsistent information (M = 4.76, SD = 1.58),
F(1, 48) = 30.33, p < .001, ηp² = .55. This gives support
to Hypothesis 2.
Figure 1. The evaluation of own and other’s information in
cooperation and competition.
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Overall, 21 out of 50 participants found the correct solu-
tion. We submitted the final decision to a logistic regres-
sion, which revealed that more participants chose the cor-
rect solution in cooperation (N = 14; 56%) than in com-
petition (N = 7; 28%), Wald χ² (1, N = 50) = 3.89, p <
.05.
Mediation Analysis
To test whether the effect of goal interdependence on the
final decision was due to the ownership bias, beyond the
preference effect, we conducted a multiple mediation
analysis. We used bootstrapping according to Preacher
and Hayes (2008) and the syntax file developed by the
same authors (http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-
mplus-macros-and-code.html). This method is particular-
ly relevant for testing the specific indirect effect of a par-
ticular mediator while controlling for the effect of other
mediator(s) in the model. Moreover, this method allows
estimating models with a dichotomous dependent vari-
able.
Before computing the bootstrap, we calculated the cor-
relations between own, consistent, and inconsistent infor-
mation. We found correlations of .26 (p = .07) between
own and consistent information, –.36 (p < .01) between
own and inconsistent information, and –.52 (p < .001)
between consistent and inconsistent information. These
correlations indicated that participants did not equate
consistent information received from others with their
own information. We therefore used own and consistent
information as mediators1. The multiple-mediation mod-
el is depicted in Figure 2.
The total and direct effects of Goal interdependence
on final decision (coded 0, 1) were –.59, p < .05, Wald
χ² (1, N = 50) = 3.89, and –.003, p = .99, Wald χ²(1, N =
50) < 1. The total indirect effect through both mediators
(the difference between the total and the direct effects)
was –.58, with a bias corrected and accelerated (BCa)
95% confidence interval (CI) of –1.77 and –.08. Thus,
the indirect effect of goal interdependence on final deci-
sion was different from 0. The direction of the paths from
goal interdependence to both mediators and from medi-
ators to final decision indicated that competition, com-
pared to cooperation, led to higher scores of own and
consistent information, which in turn led to a lower num-
ber of correct decisions. Inspection of the specific indi-
rect effects (shown in Table 1) indicated that only own
information was a significant mediator, as the 95% CI of
consistent information included 0. Thus, only own infor-
mation significantly contributed to the total indirect ef-
fect of goal interdependence on final decision, above and
beyond the preference for consistent information.
Figure 2. Multiple mediation of the
goal interdependence – decision qual-
ity relationship through preference for
own information and preference for
consistent information; *p < .05, **p
< .01.
Table 1. Bootstrapped estimates and confidence intervals
for the total and specific indirect effects of goal
interdependence on decision quality
Estimates SE BCa 95% CI
Lower Upper
Indirect effects
Own information –0.12 0.46 –1.39 –0.12
Consistent information –0.02 0.31 –0.69 0.31
Total –0.15 0.65 –1.77 –0.08
252 C. Toma et al.: Cooperation, Competition, and Ownership Bias
Social Psychology 2013; Vol. 44(4):248–255 © 2012 Hogrefe Publishing
 We used own information and consistent information as mediators instead of difference scores (between own and other’s information for
the ownership bias and between consistent and inconsistent information for the preference effect) for two reasons. First, the increased
ownership bias in competition mode was mainly due to an increase in own information. Second, we wanted to avoid covariation by calcu-
lating the ownership bias and the preference effect as the difference between own/inconsistent information and the same consistent infor-





































































































This study shows that people display an ownership bias in
information evaluation in a decision-making setting, espe-
cially when people are motivated by competition. Previous
research showed that this bias can occur in decision-mak-
ing situations (Chernyshenko et al., 2003; Van Swol et al.,
2003), but cooperation was considered as the motivation
by default in decision-making settings, and only little re-
search took into account the impact of competition on in-
formation processing (De Dreu et al., 2008; Toma & Bute-
ra, 2009).
In the present research, we provide evidence that, be-
yond the preference effect, people exhibit an ownership bi-
as in information evaluation which is especially enhanced
in competition, as shown by the interaction effect predicted
by Hypothesis 1. In particular, because people prefer con-
sistent over inconsistent information from others (Greite-
meyer & Schulz-Hart, 2003), we decided to test the own-
ership bias on both consistent and inconsistent information.
We found that, independent of goals, own information was
judged more valuable than consistent information, and ap-
parently contrary to Mojzisch et al. (2010) we also found
that own information was judged more valuable than in-
consistent information. However, in line with Hypothesis
2, simple effects revealed that own information was eval-
uated more favorably than both consistent and inconsistent
information in competition, while in cooperation own in-
formation was evaluated more favorably than consistent
information but not more than inconsistent information.
Thus, the effects found by Mojzisch et al. (2010) were rep-
licated in cooperation, while in competition the ownership
bias manifested itself as a superiority of own over others’
information, be it consistent or inconsistent with the partic-
ipants’ initial solution.
This research has a number of implications for group
decision-making. The inability of group members to dis-
cover hidden profiles has long been attributed to group-lev-
el processes like information pooling and preferences ex-
change (Winquist & Larson, 1998). Later, research showed
that, in the absence of any dysfunctional group-level pro-
cess, individual group members still have difficulties de-
tecting the best solution because they exhibit individual-
level biases in information evaluation (Faulmüller, Kersch-
reiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2010; Van Swol et al.,
2003). Our research contributes to this literature and pro-
vides evidence that the ownership bias is responsible for
poor decision quality, beyond the preference effect. More-
over, the present research suggests that individual biases
(ownership bias and preference effect) can be moderated
by group-level processes like competition and cooperation
goals. This integration suggests that the ownership bias is
an important feature of group decision-making, which
should be taken into account in professional and education-
al settings.
With regard to the ownership bias, our research might
suggest a motivational interpretation of this bias. We found
that an ownership bias occurred for both consistent and in-
consistent information only in competition. In cooperation,
people better evaluated own information compared to oth-
er’s consistent information, but not to other’s inconsistent
information – a result also found by Mojzisch et al. (2010).
Research on self-other bias also suggests that, although a
pervasive effect, the self-other bias occurs especially in sit-
uations in which people feel threatened or need to affirm
their superiority. For example, in the context of social com-
parison it has already been shown that, under self-evalua-
tion threat, participants exhibit a bias in favor of self when
they are afraid of being perceived as braggarts (Muller &
Butera, 2004). Worded differently, prior research suggests
that, under threatening situations, people are more willing
to express their superiority. The current experiment extends
this work to decision-making situations. We hypothesized
and found that competition compared to cooperation en-
hances the value attributed to own information, with the
result of reducing optimal decisions.
This study has two limitations. The first is that it does
not provide direct evidence that participants actually expe-
rienced threat or defensive reactions in competition mode
when they undervalued others’ information. An alternative
explanation could be that competition mode simply de-
creases the focus on others or reduces the certainty in oth-
ers’ information. Or it could be that people in competition
mode are less flexible, less creative, and more narrow-
minded when they solve decision-making problems (De
Dreu & Nijstad, 2008). Future research should consider
both of these alternatives.
The second limitation refers to the absence of a control
condition. Past research (Chernyshenko et al., 2003; Moj-
zisch et al., 2010; Van Swol et al., 2003) found an owner-
ship bias in group decision-making without manipulating
the goal interdependence. For example, Mojzisch et al.
(2010) found an ownership bias for consistent, but not for
inconsistent, information, which is also the result we found
in cooperation mode. Although these results look similar,
we urge caution in equating cooperative groups with con-
trol groups. As stated in the Introduction above, most re-
search conducted in the area of group decision-making has
overlooked the possibility that competition mode could be
the default motivation in groups. Within this perspective
cooperative motivations may help group members to cor-
rect their ownership bias by valuing others’ inconsistent
information. Future research should include a control con-
dition that would allow seeing where the bias is really lo-
cated.
An intriguing result for the reader could be the relatively
low percentage of correct decisions found in cooperation
mode (56%). One reason might be that final decisions were
biased in favor of initial preferences participants were
asked to provide (confirmatory decisions). We found that
only 28% of participants in this condition maintained their
initial preference. This suggests another possibility, more
related to the type of paradigm used here. In a study with
C. Toma et al.: Cooperation, Competition, and Ownership Bias 253




































































































real group discussion, Toma and Butera (2009) found that
the percentage of correct solutions in cooperation mode
was 93%. This may imply that, compared to an individual
paradigm, real group discussions have the potential to cor-
rect the members’ final decisions even when they do not
exhibit a strong confirmation bias.
Despite these limitations, this research provides, for the
first time, strong evidence that in a decision-making situa-
tion, people believe that others’ information is less valuable
than their own, especially when they are motivated by com-
petition, and that this impairs decision-making.
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